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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ADMINISTRATORS.
With two judges dissenting the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama holds in Jones v. Peables, 32 Southern, 6o, that the
Contracts administrators of an estate have not authorityto enter into a contract to mortgage all the crops
grown on the estate to pay a mortgage on the land given by
their intestate and future advances to be made by the mort-
gagee to assist in raising the crops. Compare, as support-
ing in some measure the dissenting judges, Clark v. Knox,
7o Ala. 622, and Patapsco Guano Co. v. Ballard, 107 Ala.
710.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds in
Lyman v. National Bank of the Republic, 63 N. E. 923, that
Prior Acts of where an executor borrows money of a bank
:Executors fqr the estate, and pledges stocks and bonds as
securty therefor, such securities cannot be iecovered back
by an administrator de bonis non without payment of the
loan. though the executor drew out the money on a check
payable to his own order, and appropriated it to his own
use.
ASSIGNMENTS.
Where a member of a partnership on being offered an
appointment to the public office of boiler inspector accepted.
Salary of it under an agreement whereby the salary was
Publicfe to go to the partnership, and such partner con-
tinued to draw living expenses from the partnership, such
agreement was not void, as ani assignment of an unearned
salary as a public officer, but was an agreement as to the
application of the salary when paid: Supreme Court of
Michigan in McGregor v. McGregor, 90 N. W. 284. Com-
pare Thurston v. Fairman, 9 Hun, 584, and Greenb. Pub.
Pol., 355: The distinction seems to be a very close one.
q8 "
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
In Jones v. Haines, go N. W. 518, the Supreme Court
of Iowa holds that where an attorney is employed on an
Compensation, understanding that he shall receive no compen-
Contract sation unless he obtains a favorable judgment,
and subsequently the client changes his plans as to the pro-
posed course of procedure, such change is sufficient con-
sideration to support an agreement whereby the attorney
is to receive in any event, the reasonable value of his services.
BANKIRUPTCY..
An assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors, where the assignor ig adjudged bankrupt within
,General four months after the assignment, is not entitled
Assignment, to any allowance for his services in the care
Alow--e to and preservation of the property, since the as-
Assignee signment, being an act in violation of the bank-
ruptcy law, to which he was a party, he becomes merely the
agent of the bankrupt. But such assignee is entitled to an
allowance from the estate for the actual and necessary ex-
penses incurred in preserving the property while in his pos-.
session, since such expenses would have been provable debts
of the estate had they been incurred as such by the bankrupt:
U. S. District Court (S. D. West Virginia), In re Mays,
114 Fed. 6oo.
BILLS AND NOTS.
In Tichenor.v. Owensboro Say. Bank, 68 S. W. 127, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that where the payor in
a note. executed for the price of land induced
Estoppel another to buy the note by his representation
that he had no defence thereto, and that the note would be
paid when due, he is estopped, as against the assignee, to
plead a deficit in the land by way of set-off, though he was
not aware of the deficit when he made the representation:
See Billington v. McColpin (Ky.), 6o S. W. 923.
BROKERS.
When a broker was authorized to sell land for three dol-
lars per. acre net to the owner, and was offered three dollars
Commissions and fifty cents by a purchaser, who subsequently
bought the land of the owner without the brok-
er's intermediation, the broker could not recover fifty cents
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per acre from the purchaser, but his action was against the
owner, as it was his duty to sell for the best price obtainable,
and account to the owner therefor, less a reasonable com-
pensation: Supreme Court of Arkansas in Boysen v. Rob-
ertson, 68 S. W. 243. Chief Justice Bunn dissents.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS.
The dual relation of debtor and stockholder which fre-
quently arises between building and loan associations and
Rights of investors gives rise to some interesting ques-
Borrowing tions. Thus the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
Stockholder holds in Wills v. Paducah Building and Loan
Association, 67 S. W. 991, that a borrowing stockholder of
an insolvent building and loan association, which had made
an assignment for the benefit of creditors, was not entitled
to credit on her loan for the amount of dues paid on her
stock, though she had, before the assignment was made,
ceased to pay, and had filed suit seeking.to have all her pay-
ments applied to the discharge of her debts, as the associa-
tion had been insolvent for some time before she quit pay-
ing, and had been endeavoring to wind up its affairs with a
view to liquidation: See Reddick v. A~sociation's As-
signee, 49 S. W. 1075. If the fact of insolvency is to be
made the test, numerous cases can be imagined in which it
will be difficult of application.
CARRIERS.
A. purchased a return trip ticket of the B. railway. The
ticket was in eight coupons, four for the outward and four
Mistake of for the return trip, each containing a notice
Conductor that it was void if detached from the signature
coupon. On the outward trip the first two conductors .tore
off coupons from the wrong end of the ticket. The third
conductor told A. of the mistake, and delivered to him the
coupons which should have been first taken, stating that
he could use them in place of those taken. On the return
trip the conductor refused to take the detached coupons and
on A.'s refusal to pay fare put him off the car. A 'c:
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the next car, paid the fare, forty cents, and rode to his des-
tination. He then sued for breach of contract with aggra-
vated damages. Under these facts the Supreme Court of
Michigan holds in Brown v. Rapid Ry. Co., go N. W. 29 o,
that he was entitled to recover only the forty cents which he
was compelled to pay for the extra fare. No authority is
cited.
The Supreme Court of Michigan holds in Johnson v. De-
troit Y. & A. A. Ry., go N. W. 274, that the rule relieving
Assault an the master from liability for a malicious injury
Passenger inflicted by his servant when not acting within
the scope of his employment does not apply between a com-
mon carrier of passengers and a passenger, since it is the
duty of the carrier to protect its passengers against injury
from the wilful misconduct of its servants while performing
the contract to carry. The duty of protection of passengers
owed by the common carrier has usually been illustrated in
the decisions in cases of female passengers. But the prin-
ciple remains the same in the case of a male passenger and
it is here so applied.
-A., who had formerly been a railroad employe, when pas-
sengers were carried on all trains, purchased a ticket and
Construction was accepted by the conductor of a construction
Train train, as a passenger thereon, which was against
the defendant's orders, except on official permit of which
A. had no notice. He knew nothing about the construction
train except that he had ridden thereon before as a. pas-
senger, and that other passengers were on the train when he
took it. Construction trains were not on the defendant's
passenger time tables, but two other freight trains were, and
the train in question looked like an ordinary freight train,
except that it carried only a single car. Upon this case the
Supreme Court of Iowa holds in Spence v. Chicago R. L &
P. Ry. Co., 90 N. W. 346, that the conductor had such an
apparent .authority to accept A. as a passenger that such
acceptance made him a passenger, and as such he could
recover for injuries caused by the defendant's negligence:
Compar6 Shoemaker v. Kingsbury, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 369,
where the United States Supreme Court reaches a different
conclusion on similar, but not identical, facts.
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CODS PLBADING.
The difficulties aising -from the desire to consolidate
actions under the code system, and the tendency of the
Petition, courts to lean towards methods of the older
Distinct practice, are constantly appearing in the cases.
Theory A new example is presented in Grentner v. Feh-
renschield, 68 Pac. 619, where the Supreme Court of Kansas
holds that the plaintiff must frame his petition upon a dis-
tinct and definite theory, and upon that theory the facts
alleged must state a good cause of action. If the petition
is not drawn upon a single and definite theory, or there is
such a confusion of theories alleged that the court cannot
determine from the general scope of the petition upon which
of several theories a recovery is sought, it is insufficient.
Compare Supervisors of Kewaunee County v. Decker, 30
Wis. 624.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
A stipulation in a contract for the carriage of a horse, lim-
iting liability in case of injury from the negligence of the
carrier to $ioo, is held in Hughes v. Pennsyl-
of Lyf I"- vania R. Co., 51 Atl. 99 o , by the Supreme Court
by of Pennsylvania, to be against the policy of the
Carie state so as not to be enforceable when the injury
occurs within the state, though the contract-is made outside
the state, for carriage from a point without to a point
within it by connecting carriers.
It is further held that the interstate commerce act, the
object of which is to secure continuous passage and uniform
rates, and to compel the furnishing of equal facilities, is not
violated by holding a contract- for carriage from a point
without the state to a point within it invalid, so far as con-
cerns points within the state, in its stipulation limiting the
carrier's- liability in case of injury from negligence. Two
judges dissent from the opinion of the court.
CONNECTING CARRIERS.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) holds, in Jacobs v. Third Ave. R. Co., 75 N. Y.
E ection of Supp. 679, that a street railway company is liable
Passenger for ejecting a person who presents -a transfer
ticket from a connecting road, not acceptable "nrlo- " -
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of the company because not properly punched, though the
mistake was made by an employe of a connecting road, there
being a traffic agreement between the two roads, whereby
transfers were issued from one to the other. The ground
of the decision is that, under the traffic agreement between
the two railroads, each conductor acted as agent of the
respective railroads in issuing transfer tickets for carriage
thereon. See Minor v. Railroad Co., 53 N. Y. 363; Talcott
v. Railroad Co., 89 Hun, 492.'
CONSTITUTIONAI, LAW.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Lowe v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 41 S. E. 297, that a statute pro-
Interstate viding that a common carrier shall pay a pen-
Commerce alty Of $500 for shipping freight by a route
other than that designated by the shipper, is unconstitutional
when applied to goods shipped from a foreign state, as in
violation of the interstate commerce section of the Federal
Constitution.
The Tennessee Code provides that in non-resident attach-
ment proceedings, based on attachment of property and ser-
Attachment vice by publication, "when the property attached
against is not sufficient to satisfy the recovery, execution
Nonresidents may issue for the residue as in other cases." In
Kemper-Thomas Paper Co. v. Shyer, 67 S. W. 856, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee, considering this provision,
holds that in so far as it attempts to authorize a personal
judgment and an. execution against a non-served, non-
appearing, non-resident for any amount whatever after the
appropriation of his impounded property, it is repugnant
to the due process of law clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Federal constitution. Two judges dissent.
In Wilson v. Iserninger, 22 S. C. R. 573, the United
States Supreme Court holds that no unconstitutional impair-
Obligation ment of the obligation of a contract is made by
o - the provision of the Pennsylvania act, April 27,
Cotracts 1855, § 7, conclusively presuming a release and
extinguishment of any irredeemable ground rent on which
no payment or demand for payment has been made for
twenty-one years, and of whose existence no acknowledg-
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ment has been made during that period, even though such
provision is applicable to a ground rent reserved before the
passage of the act, as the further provision that "this section
shall not go into effect until three years from the passage
of this act," gave a reasonable time to the owners of such
ground rents for preserving their rights.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds, in Porter v.
Charleston & S. Ry. Co., 41 S. E. io8, that a statute pro-
Damages viding a penalty on common carriers for failure
to to pay or refusal to pay damages on freight
Frelght within sixty days is not in violation of the Fed-
eral constitution as denying to the carrier the equal pro-
tection of the laws, nor is it unconstitutional as in conflict
with the interstate commerce clause of the constitution.
CONTRACTS.
Where a contract of employment of an actor provided
for its termination at any time on two weeks' notice by the
Damages employer, on an arbitrary discharge on five
days' notice by telegram, the damages under the
contract could not be more than the two weeks' salary:
City Court of New York (General Term) in Dallas v.
Murry, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1040. See Watson v. Russell, 149
N. Y. 388.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) holds, in Collister v. Hayman, 75 N. Y. Supp.
Transfer- 1102, that if theatre tickets are mere personal
ability licenses, given by the proprietor to the pur-
chaser to enter and witness the- performance, as it is said
the weight of authority indicates, they are not salable or
transferable by the purchaser, notwithstanding he has a
municipal license therefore.
Where a husband agreed with his wife, in consideration
of the discharge by her of a mortgage on his property, that
Making wi, he would not change, alter or revoke a will there-
Specific tofore made by hih, leaving all his property to
Performance her, and after performance by her made a new
will, leaving the property in trust to his executor, to pay the
income to her for'life, and then convey to another, on such
last will being probated, such agreement should be-enforced
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in equity, by requiring the legal title to be conveyed -to her:
New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) in Kine v. Farrell, 75 N. Y. Supp. 542.
In Caldwell v. Frazier, 68 Pac. 1076, the Supreme Court
of Kansas holds that an option contract to purchase is but
Option, a continuing offer to sell, and conveys no in-
Specific terest in the property, and that when such a
Performance contract is accepted it takes effect from the date
of acceptance, and bihds the grantee only to a conveyance
of the property in its present condition. If, it is said, inter-
vening the offer and acceptance, the improvements thereon
are destroyed by fire, equity will not decree a specific per-
formance of the contract with the improvements restored,
or with an abatement in price equal to the lost improvements;
See Bras v. Sheffeld, 49 Kans. 702.
CORPORATIONS.
In Pitman v. Chicago Lead Co., 67 S. W. 946, the Court
of Appeals of Kansas City holds that where the directors of
Preferenceto an insolvent corporation conveyed property to
Director, one of its members in payment of an alleged cor-
Burden of porate debt such director has the burden of prov-
froof ing the good faith of the transaction, and that he
did not vote for such proposition nor improperly influence
his associates to do so; and a showing that the debt was
genuine, and that the preference was made by a quorum of
the directors without the vote of such director is insufficient.
In Missouri it is well settled that an insolvent corporation
may prefer its creditors, but the degree of proof sufficient to
uphold such a preference in favor of a director is settled by
this case: Compare State v. Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co.,
149 Mo. 181.
A secret contract between a corporation and certain stock-
holders that, at the end of two years, the corporation will
Contracts repurchase their stock at a IO per cent advance,
with is void as to creditors of the corporation, the
Stockholders , capital stock being a trust fund for the benefit
of creditors; and such stockholders are not entitled to file
a claim against the corporation for the amount of such
repurchase price in proceedings to wind up the affairs of
the corporation: Supreme Court of Illinois in Olmstead v.
545
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Vance & Jones Co., 63 N. E. 634. See, in connection with
this case, Clapp v. Petersonj 104 Ill. 26; Bank v. Burch., 141
Ill 519.
DIMDS.
A vendor of realty, having secured the cash payments and
notes for the purchase price, executed a deed which he
Delivery, retained, in order that his wife who was ill at
statute of the time, might subsequently sign it. The
Frauds vendee went into possession, and the vendor
assumed that he had title to the notes. The Supreme Court
of Tennessee holds, under these facts, that no title passed
because there was no delivery of the deed, and that the deed
could not be regarded as a memorandum satisfying the stat-
ute of frauds, and entitling the vendee to specific perform-
ance: Wilson v. Winters, 67 S. W. 8oo. The court regards
such a memorandum as incomplete without delivery. Com-
pare an apparent exception to this view in Bowles v. Wood-
son, 6 Grat. 78.
EVIDENCE.
It is frequently said that statements made in the presence
of a person accused of a crime charging him with the com-
crimina mission of it, if uncontradicted by him, are ad-
Law, missible in evidence against him. This almost
Admissions seems like manufacturing testimony, for on the
other hand, if he voluntarily answers, his replies would be
evidence. In People v. Young, 76 N. Y. Supp. 275, the
New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First De-
partment) takes a somewhat different view from that ordi-
narily suggested and holds that evidence that after defen-
dant's arrest a statement of a third person connecting him
with the murder was read to him, and that he said nothing,
is not admissible against him as an admission; the officer
in charge cautioning him that he was not required to speak,
as anything he said might be used against him, and telling
him that the statement was to inform him of the nature of
the evidence against him. The attending circumstances
make the actual .decision somewhat weak, but the policy of
the general rule may be questioned: See People v. Kennedy,
164 N. Y. 449.
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In Meyer v. Brown, 90 N. W. 285, the Supreme Court
of Michigan holds that on the question of weight of wood
Entries in shipped by the plaintiff to the defendant, books
Books of the railroad in which are copied in the regular
course of business the weights of cars, from the cards on
which the weights are first entered under the supervision of
the weighmaster, he comparing the entries in the books with
the cards, after which the cards are destroyed, are competent,
the weighmaster being called to authenticate them: See
Lassone v. Railroad Co. (N. H.), 24 Atl. 9o2.
In Iowa following the policy of some of the states an
illegitimate is allowed to inherit from the father in case he
Illegitimate has recognized it either publicly and notoriously
Children or in writing (Code § 3385). In applying this
provision of the Code the Supreme Court holds in Britt v.
Hall, go N. W. 34o, that declarations by a deceased parent
recognizing an illegitimate child are admissible as declara-
tions against interest in an action by the child against the
father's executor to be allowed to inherit; but declarations
denying paternity are not admissible.
In an action for slander, words spoken at different times
before suit brought, though not declared on, may be given
in evidence to show the intent with which the
slandr words declared on were spoken; but words
spoken after suit brought cannot be given in evidence, for
they may be the ground of another action: Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia in Swindell v. Harper, 41 S. E.
117. See Moigan v. Livingston, 2 Rich. 573, and Howell
v. Cheatham, Cooke, 247.
The Supreme Court of Arizona holds, in Qualey v. Ter-
ritory, 68 Pac. 546, that where the court below erred in
Impeachment sustaining an objection to a question seeking
of to lay the foundation for impeachment of the
Witness witness by evidence of prior conversations of the
witness, such error is harmless and not ground for reversal,
when it is not followed by an offer to establish such conver-
sations. -"Were this cause reversed and a new. trial granted
for the reason assigned, there is no showing in the record
indicating that the witness would or could be impeached in
the manner indicated by the question excluded by the court."
Compare Snead v. Tiet]en, 24 Pac. 324.
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In an action against a municipal corporation for injuries
from a defective sidewalk, statements by- an ex-councilman
Sttements as to what knowledge he had of the defect while
by an a member of the city council, were not admis-
Ex-OMidal sible, as he could not bind the city after the
termination of his term: Supreme Court of Oregon in
Adkins v. City of Monmouth, 68 Pac. 737.
FIXTURES.
In Schellenberg v. Detroit Heating and Lighting Co.,
90 N. W. 47, the Supreme Court of Michigan holds that,
Title where machinery is purchased by a husband
to under a contract, that title is to remain in the
Realty seller till paid for, and it is installed by the seller
at the request of the husband on real estate held in the name
of the husband and wife, the want of unity of title to the
machinery and ownership of the land prevents the machinery
from becoming a part of the realty, and it may be removed
by the seller.
INFANTS.
Attorneys who have represented a minor in litigation
are entitled to a lien on his recovery for a reasonable com-
Compensation pensation: Supreme Court of Tennessee in
of Attorney American Lead Pencil Co. v. Davis, 67 S. W.
864. But they cannot have the amount of their fees fixed
on an ex parte application to the court.
INJUNCTIONS.
In Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 51 Atl. 973, a case
of considerable newspaper notoriety, the Supreme Court of
rhatrailty Pennsylvania holds thata contract of employ-
ment of a ball player for a season, giving the
employer a right of renewal of the contract for three suc-
ceeding seasons, by notice given before the close of each
current season, and providing for termination of the con-
tract on ten days' notice, and providing that the employe
may be enjoined from playing for another during the con-
tinuance of the contract, these provisions being declared
part of the consideration for the agreement to pay-the stipu-
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lated salary, is not lacking in mutuality of remedy, or so
unreasonable as to prevent the issuance of an injunction, the
contract having been partly pei-formed and the employer
being desirous of its continuance.
In general the court holds that, to authorize an injunction
restraining an employe from rendering services for another
contrary to his contract of employment, it is necessary that
they be of such a unique character; and display such a special
knowledge, skill and ability, as to render them of peculiar
value to the employer and difficult of substitution.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
The Supreme Court of Kansas holds, in State v. Cairns,
68 Pac. 621, that the agent of an express company, who in
Delivery good faith delivers to the assignee, or upon his
by order, goods carried by his principal, consigned
Express C. 0. D., and collects the charges thereon, is
Company not guilty of selling intoxicating liquors to the
purchaser, or his order, though he has reason to believe or
knows the goods so consigned and delivered to be ihitoxicat-
ing liquors. In such case, it is held, it is the consignor who
delivers the intoxicating liquor to the carrier upon an order
from the consignee that makes the sale, and the sale is made
at the place of delivery to the common carrier. The impor-
tant bearing of this decision upon the question of the rela-
tion of the carrier to traffic which the state seeks to control
is obvious. See also Cont. v. Fleming, 130 Pa. 138, and
State v. Flanagan, 38 W. Va. 53, 17 S. E. 792.
JUDGME NT.
In Cahnmann v. Mefropolitan St. Ry. Co. 75 N. Y. Supp.
970, the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Term) holds
Res that where a firm recovered a judgment against
Judicata a street railroad company for damdges to the
firm's horse and wagon, caused by the negligence of the
street railroad company, and the question of the company's
negligence and the contributory negligence of one of the
firm, who was driving the team, .had been litigated in that
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action, the judgment rendered therein in favor of the firm
is admissible in the driver's favor, in an action brought by
him alone to recover for personal injuries received. Com-
pare House v. Lockwood, 137 N. Y. 259, and authorities
there cited.
LIEAS.
The Surrogate's Court of Kings County, New York,
holds, In re Henshaw, 75 N. Y. Supp. io47, that a covenant
covenants of a lessor to buy, at the termination of the lease,
of Lessor the buildings remaining on the premises, is per-
sonal to the lessor, and (foes not run with the land nor. bind
heirs or legaties, Compare Tallman v. Coffin, 4 N. Y. 134.
The court says: "The general theory of contracts of char-
acter similar to this is that, where there is no specific pro-
vision making it a covenant running with the land, then it
can be admitted as a personal covenant only.
LIMITATIONS.
In Farm Inv. Co. v. 'Wyoming College and Normal
School, 68 Pac. 561, the Supreme Court of Wyoming holds
c Uateral that a creditor responsible for the loss of col-
security lateral security notes by the bar of the statute
Notes of limitations is chargeable with the value
thereof as of the date of the bar, and not of the date of the
collateral's maturity, as had the notes been collected after
maturity, the date of. collection would be the date of credit
to the principal debtor.
MECHANIC'S LIEN.
The City Court of New York (Trial Term) holds, in
Berger Mfg. Co. v. Zabriskie, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1038, that
Liability of a provision in a lease that the tenants shall make
Landlord all repairs, etc., is not. such a consent on the part
of the landlord that a third party shall furnish labor and
materials as to give the latter a mechanic's lien therefor,
especially in the absence of any notice or knowledge on the
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The difficulty in developing a standard of due care in
negligence cases appears in San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v.
Contributory Gray, 67 S. W. 763, where the court is con-
Negligence fronted with the question of how far danger to
human life will render an act not negligent which is gener-
ally held to be so. The Supreme Court of Texas there holds
that, where the plaintiff was injured while running on a rail-
road track to rescue his child, who was in danger of being
run down by an approaching train, the fact that he was
wrongfully on the track when he discovered his child's
peril does not make him a trespasser in his subsequent efforts
to save his child; nor was it under such circumstances con-
tributory negligence for him to run back along the track
towards the train in an effort to save the child. See Spooner
v. Railroad Co., 115 N. Y. 22; Becker v. Railway Co., 61
S. W. 997.
PROXIMATE CAUSE.
In Watson v. Dilts, 89 N. W. io68, the Supreme Court
of Iowa holds that recovery may be had for nervotis pros-
Nevous tration from fright, caused by the defendant's
Prostration trespassing, by stealthily entering, in the night-
time, plaintiff's home; this being a physical injury, and in
the view of the court, the proximate result of the wrong.
Some of the cases bearing upon this question will be found
reviewed in Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401. See, also, note
in Ewing v. Railway Co. (Pa.), 14 L. R. A. 666.
RENT.
In Shell v. West, 41 S. E. 65, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina holds that an executor renting devised land
Action by can recover the rents, notwithstanding the claim
Executor of the devisee, on showing that the rents are
required to pay the testator's debts. See Moore v. Shields,
68 N. C. 332.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
In Talbot v. Sioux National Bank, 22 S. C. R. 621, the
United States Supreme Court holds that a petition which
shows on its face that the action was not com-
Pleading menced within the statutory period, may be met
by a demurrer, and the statute of limitations need not be set
up in an answer or plea.
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In Hughes v. Birney's Heirs, 32 Southern, 30, the Su-*
preme Court of Louisiana holds that if, after submergence,
ReapPearc,, the water disappears, from the land either by
Ownership gradual retirement or by the elevation of the
land by natural or artificial means, and its identity can be
established by reasonable marks or by situation, extent,
quantity or boundary lines, the proprietorship remains in
the original owner. And it is said: "No lapse of time dur-
ing which the submergence has continued bars the right of
the owner to enter upon the land reclaimed and assert his
proprietorship :" See City of St. Louis v. Ruts, 138 U. S.
226.
TELRGRAMS.
In North Carolina among others the following rights of
action do not survive: "Causes of action for false imprison-
Rgfit of ment, assault and battery, or other injury to the
Action, person, where such injury does not cause the
Survival death of the injured party." The fact that this
provision has its counterpart in the legislation of most of
the states renders the decision of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina 'in Morton v. Western Union Tel. Co., 41
S. E. 484, of more than local interest. It is there held
actions for injury to the person include an action against
a telegraph company to recover for mental anguish caused
by its delay in delivering a telegr-am.
USURY.
Against the dissent of three judge§ the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky holds in Blakeley v. Adams, 68 S. W. 473,
Payment that in an action on a note executed by the
by Surety obligor to reimburse the payee for money paid
as the obligor's surety the obligor is not estopped to plead
that the debt paid by the surety embraced usury, and to
resist a recovery to that extent, unless it is made to appear
that he stood by and permitted the surety to pay the debt
in ignorance of the fact that it embraced usury.
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The fact that the waters of a water course find their source
in springs situated on land owned by a person, does not jus-
Riparian tify him in erecting a dam on his land by which
Owners the water is spread out, and in consequei.ce of
evaporation less than formerly flows to the riparian pro-
prietors below: Supreme Court of California in Barneich
v. Mercy, 68 Pac. 589. The property rights of such land
owner, it is held, are lost after the water has passed into the
water course. See,, upon the subject, Eddy v. Simpson,
3 Cal. 253.
The difference in the rules of law governing underground
water which flows in a defined channel and such as does not
Underground is well settled. In Board of Supervisors of
Channels, Clarke County v. Mississippi Lumber Co., 31
Evidence Southern, 905, the Supreme Court of Mississippi
holds that underground waters are presumed to be perco-
lating, and therefore, in order to enable one to maintain
rights in them such as he would have in a surface stream,
it must be shown that they flow in a well-defined and distinct
underground channel, the existence of which is known or
easily ascertainable: See the note to Wheelock v. Jacobs
(Vt.) 43 L. R. A. 105.
WAYS.
The right to a way of necessity over the lands of a
grantor existing in favor of the grantee, because the land
Way by granted is surrounded partially by the land of
Necessity the grantor and elsewhere by the land of stran-
gers, is not affected by a contract of sale of part of the
surrounding lands of the grantor, made prior to the convey-
ance to the grantee, and of which he had no notice: Supreme
Court of Iowa in Fairchild v. Stewart,-89 N. W. 1075.
WILIS.
Whether it is possible to give a person a fee simple interest
in land and at the same time limit it over upon his death in
Restraints on case he does not alienate or will it, is a question
Alienation of some doubt. It arose in Kelley v. Hogan,
76 N. Y. Supp. 5, where the New York Supreme Court
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(Appellate Division,'- First Department) holds, with one
judge dissenting, thai it may not be done on the ground that
the limitation over Was repugnant to the former provision,
and was void as an attempt to limit the estate after a
previous disposition thereof.
The question of how long alienation may be prevented ,
comes before the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Wallace
v. Smith, 68 S. W. 131, where it is held that a provision
of a will that land devised to an infant shall not be sold until
he is thirty-five years old is an absolute condition of the
devise, and not a mere request or suggestion, and not being
an unreasonable restraint of alienation, is valid. In Gray,
Restr. Alien. Prop. § 5z, it is said: "The actual state of the
law in the United States is as follows: It has often been
said that a condition against alienation confined to a limited
period is good, but such remarks have been obiter dicta with-
out any reasoning or citation of authorities." It is further
said: "The weight of authority, and especially of reasoned
authority, is against the validity of restraints upon aliena-
tion, however limited in time." The court however in the
present case refused to adopt Professor Gray's view, and the
decision is as above stated.
In Simpson v. Millsops, 31 Southern, 912, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi holds that where a will directed that
income, the income of the corpus of the estate should be
Stock paid to certain beneficiaries for life, increase in
3ramings the value of stock owing to the earnings of the
corporation after the testator's death having been withheld
by the corporation and carried to the surplus, instead of
distributed as dividends, was income and belonged to the
life beneficiaries. The argument of counsel for appellants,
in whose favor the decision of the court is rendered, is an
elaborate and exhaustive review of the authorities on the
subject, the court saying: "The authorities on all phases
of this question are presented and discussed with absolute
fairness and much ability in the written argument of solici-
tors for appellants."
